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their citizens? Do other states have a
responsibility to intervene when citizens’
states do not? Do human rights trump
sovereignty? For over two decades, we
have failed to answer these questions.
If the “international community”
has no answer, how can we expect
fighters—a young soldier battling
Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan or
a drone pilot sitting in an operations
center tracking a suspected terrorist in
Yemen—to answer them? The received
law of war was not designed for this.
Efforts to fit modern war into this
structure create more problems in
turn, undermining both domestic
and international law. The rule of
law, Brooks argues, is critical to all
societies and to international order.
One solution she suggests is to update
our laws and international structures,
as challenging as that task might be.
We should think of war and peace as
poles on a spectrum, and envision that
we move closer to one or the other over
time. We should reject rigid definitions
of war as an all-or-nothing concept.
Brooks argues that endless war
undermines American institutions as
well as the rule of law. The Department
of Defense has assumed missions
that it is ill equipped by culture and
training to perform—such as nation
building and civil reconstruction—at
the expense of other agencies that
traditionally have carried out American
public policy and diplomacy overseas,
such as the State Department. Brooks
submits that, for policy implementation,
the military has become a one-stop
shopping center—like Walmart.
Brooks’s tale also chronicles a
personal journey. As the child of
antiwar activists, then throughout her
career as a law professor, human rights
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lawyer, State Department lawyer, and
Defense Department official, she has
experienced and here relates her close
encounters with most of the subjects
about which she writes, in part owing
to her marriage to an Army Special
Forces officer. Anyone who has served
in the Pentagon in any capacity will
get a chuckle or two from Brooks’s
tales of her time in this unique place.
This book is informative, enlightening,
and entertaining. As director of national
security legal studies at the Army War
College from 2000 to 2006, I struggled
to answer the same questions Brooks
addresses in her book. How Everything
Became War and the Military Became
Everything should be required reading
for anyone interested in military strategy
and national security, or anyone who
wonders how we got where we are today
and how we might find a better way.
THOMAS W. MCSHANE

Rough Waters: Sovereignty and the American Merchant Flag, by Rodney P. Carlisle, with Bradford
Smith. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,
2017. 304 pages. $31.95.

Rough Waters is a historical review of
the use and significance of the port of
registry (which yields a “flag state”)
of merchant vessels. Author Rodney
Carlisle has revisited his prior work
Sovereignty for Sale: The Origins and
Evolution of the Panamanian and
Liberian Flags of Convenience (Naval
Institute Press, 1982, out of print)
and augmented it with his other prior
periodical work to provide a deeper
history of the use of merchant ship flags.
Generally speaking, Rough Waters is
well researched—with the profound
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exception of the defamatory analysis
of and allegations about the Liberian
registry during the period 2001–2003.
The source of most of this misinformation is provocative allegations deriving
from a commercial lawsuit, as well as an
inaccurate reference to a UN report. The
lawsuit was withdrawn and the allegations were never substantiated, as they
were and remain patently false. Furthermore, the author’s incorrect and loosely
referenced opinion that the Marshall
Islands flag constitutes a de facto second
U.S. registry cannot go unmentioned.
Contrary to the statement that the
Marshall Islands flag registry has been
structured along the Delaware domestic
model to aid U.S. strategic interests,
the reality is that the Marshall Islands
registry was formed by copying Liberian
law and constitutes an impropriety
constructed for commercial purpose and
private financial gain. For these reasons,
this reviewer is unable to recommend
Rough Waters, or to endorse it as an
accurate review of the impact of foreign
flags on the American merchant fleet.
Rough Waters attempts to address the
role of foreign flags in the decline of the
American merchant marine. Despite
providing some evidence to the contrary,
the author articulates a one-sided thesis
that foreign flags predominantly are
used for sinister or nefarious purposes.
He further suggests that commercial
interests, in their taking advantage
of less-developed nations, were the
predominant cause of the collapse
of the U.S.-flag fleet. Curiously, the
book chronicles, yet fails to highlight,
that one of the most prevalent flags of
convenience throughout history was the
British flag—and the greatest facilitator
of alternative registration of U.S.-owned
ships was the U.S. government.
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Rough Waters describes in interesting
detail the intentional use of nonnational
flags as a means to mislead, to dissuade,
and often to evade pursuit by navies and
other authorities. Whether it was the
slave trade, the Southern or Northern
fleets on either side of the U.S. Civil War,
rum-running during U.S. Prohibition,
or U.S. involvement in World War I and
the early half of World War II, the lack
of technology during these eras meant
that identification of a ship’s nationality depended on visually sighting the
flag flying on its stern. This made use
of the flag ripe for manipulation.
While some of these practices indeed
were nefarious, others served legitimate
purposes, and the U.S. government
encouraged them. During the Civil
War, ships changed flag because the
Northern and Southern governments
could not protect them. In the 1870s,
building ships in the United States was
expensive, so shipowners sought to
construct and register ships abroad—a
situation that continues today. In the
lead-up to both world wars, the U.S.
State Department and the U.S. Shipping
Board facilitated transfer of the majority of U.S. ships to the Panamanian
flag. Despite the assertion in Rough
Waters that use of Panama’s flag was
immoral, the political landscape and
the rise of fascism in Europe made use
of a foreign flag a political necessity.
Of particular interest to Review readers
may be elements of Alfred Thayer
Mahan’s theories on sea power. Rough
Waters illustrates the practical impossibility of even the world’s greatest
navy protecting domestically registered
commercial ships in all the far reaches of
the earth. History provides only a very
few examples of the U.S. Navy coming
directly to the aid of a merchant ship. In
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each of those cases, logistical convenience and a specific political interest
were the determining factors for intervention. If a merchant vessel possesses
strategic interest, its flag has never prevented the U.S. Navy from taking action.
Currently, almost 75 percent of the
world’s global trading merchant fleet
is registered with ten flag states. Of
these ten, only those of Greece and the
People’s Republic of China are considered “national flags.” The remaining
64 percent of these commercial ships
are registered in Panama, Liberia, the
Marshall Islands, Hong Kong, Singapore,
Malta, the Bahamas, or Cyprus. Rough
Waters fails to consider or identify the
impacts of shifts in global trade and
trade economics, technology, and ship
ownership, construction, financing,
and crewing, which are the realities
that underlie the choice of a flag state.
Very few ships are owned by “pure”
U.S. companies, and the global use
of global flags did not cause the collapse of the U.S. merchant marine.
SCOTT BERGERON

Practise to Deceive: Learning Curves of Military
Deception Planners, by Barton Whaley. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2016. 256 pages.
$39.95.

This is a quirky yet ultimately enjoyable
book. The association of the author,
Barton Whaley, with the U.S. intelligence
services dates back to the Korean War.
He earned his undergraduate degree
from Berkeley and his PhD from MIT.
Over the course of his career Whaley
worked with or for the U.S. Army,
the Naval Postgraduate School, and
the director of national intelligence.
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A. Denis Clift, president of the National Intelligence University, referred to
Whaley as “the undisputed dean of U.S.
denial and deception experts.” Whaley
died in 2013, leaving behind several
completed volumes and a legacy as a
man with a passion for and an encyclopedic knowledge of military deception.
A central assumption of Practise to
Deceive is that the only tool that has a
hope of “dispelling the fog of war” is
intelligence—but it is the task of the
deception planner to keep that fog
thick. When deception planners do
their job right, the enemy must deal
with uncertainty, and surprise can
be achieved. This is not exactly new
ground. Many students of history, as
well as most current members of the
national security enterprise, are aware,
at least to some degree, of famous
deception operations. These range from
the Trojan horse of Odysseus to the
deployment of the imaginary First U.S.
Army Group to southeast England in
the months before D-day 1944. Whaley
reminds us that deception plans do not
just appear; they are the brainchildren
of talented individuals—the deception
planners. Practise to Deceive neglects
neither deception plans nor deception
operations, but its primary intent is to
shed light on those planners and how
they think. As it turns out, that is a
pretty tall order. In addition, Whaley
tells readers they should walk away
with an awareness of the threats that
enemy deception efforts pose and how
we can improve our own efforts.
Unfortunately, the book’s structure
does not lead the reader to a
rapid understanding of the mind of
the deception planner. Indeed, most
readers, particularly those unfamiliar
with the subject, will be well served to
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